Pundits divided over future of private media after recent crackdown

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English edition 
October 19, 2010

The recent crackdown on privately-owned Egyptian media has left many observers perplexed. The move is raising questions over whether the newly-imposed constraints are temporary measures--only aimed at silencing the media during the upcoming elections--or if they represent a radical shift in the government’s attitude towards independent media.

“To what extent is the regime taking it further? Is it just for the elections or is it more than that? Is the regime considering a new way of running the country?” questioned prominent writer and a history professor at Helwan University Sherif Younes.

“We can only make speculations because the main players responsible for these acts are secretive and unaccountable," he added. "We are ruled by a secret regime.”

The government launched the clampdown with the ban of the popular news talk show “al-Qahera al-Youm” last month. On the heels of the show's closing, Ibrahim Eissa, one of the staunchest critics of the ruling regime, was sacked from his position as editor-in-chief of the private daily Al-Dostour. His dismissal attracted a deluge of media attention, including fears that the Egyptian media landscape may lose a newspaper known for its inflammatory criticism of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).

Dina Shehata, a political expert with Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, believes these developments are aimed at more than just covering up expected electoral violations in the parliamentary poll slated for November. They signal the kickoff of a series of tougher restrictions that TV channels and newspapers will face from now until the presidential race set for fall 2011, Shehata predicts.

“They [the NDP] believe the independent media are their primary enemy,” said Shehata. “You can sense that in the NDP leaders’ discourse. They keep saying that the government is making achievements but the media do not make people sense them.”

The NDP is expected to field candidates for each of the 508 parliamentary seats set for contest. Alike 2005, this year's poll will feature at least 150 candidacies from the nation’s strongest and largest opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood. A verbal war already wages between the ruling party and the banned-but-tolerated Islamist group.  For many observers, this discursive standoff is expected to be the prelude to a violent and rigged electoral race.

“The 2010 elections will be a continuation of the second and third phases of the 2005 poll,” said Gamal Heshmat, member of the Musim Brotherhood’s Shura Council told Al-Masry Al-Youm, in reference to the electoral violence and fraud that pervaded the 2005 elections. Clashes over the polling claimed at least 13 lives.

“The NDP wants to deprive any force from meeting the eligibility requirements necessary to field a presidential candidate, ” he added.

As dictated by the 2007 constitutional amendments, an independent presidential hopeful has to garner the support of at least 250 elected members of the parliament’s lower and upper houses as well as municipal councils. Reaching such a number is next to impossible for a non-NDP candidate. The NDP continues to boast a sweeping majority in all legislative bodies.

In recent months, the independent media has been discussing the murky future of political succession as President Mubarak remains reluctant to appoint a vice-president despite reports of ill-heath. In the meantime, the private press has exposed reports of an alleged rift within the ruling regime over succession.

To Shehata, the cost of cracking down further on these private outlets would be nominal. “If a crackdown happens, are there any players that could get mobilized against it in a way that would pose a threat to the regime?” questioned Shehata rhetorically. “Only the US could voice criticism but the regime will not even listen to that unless it gets translated into actives measures against the government that could affect the aid for example.”

And using aid to deter the Egyptian government from tightening its grip on democratic institutions does not seem to be on the US government agenda. Last week, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) decided to increase its aid allocation for Egypt by 20 percent--to US$250 million.

The aid increase decision coincided with a Ministry of Communications announcement to impose restrictions on text messaging use in disseminating cellphone news alerts. And to add fuel to the fire, the Ministry of Information requested nine channels relocate their real-time coverage units to permanent offices at the Egyptian Media Production City as a precondition for receiving approval to broadcast material to or from Egypt. The move to this location, situated in the western outskirts of Cairo, is expected to prevent satellite channels from airing live broadcasts of protests and demonstrations that take place in different spots nationwide.

Moreover, the privately-owned On TV received a notice to stop airing its news ticker. And, in yet another incident, four religious satellite channels were closed down for allegedly inciting sectarian tension last week.
Unlike most analysts, Samer Soliman, a political scientist with the American University in Cairo contended that these consecutive incidents might not be connected and do not inherently indicate the introduction of a larger policy aimed at debilitating the private media.

“I believe the regime managed to adapt with the space it has granted to the media," said Soliman. "It has developed more sophisticated tools to control the media.”  The incendiary content of independent papers or TV shows is not enough to prompt any major action on the government’s part, he added.

“It is true that the media constitute a challenge to the regime but they cannot mobilize the people," said Soliman. "The media do not necessarily lead to any action on the street.”

For the last ten years, the media market has witnessed a boom in privately-owned newspapers and satellite channels. Few of these outlets have developed a solid agenda of political coverage that broaches sensitive topics, including the flaws of the Mubarak regime.

Yet, a complete closure of such outlets remains inconceivable, according to Helwan University's Younes.
“Instead, they will keep targeting particular shows or particular channels from one time to another,” he said.

“Closing down the private media is not in the regime’s best interest. The regime needs them to serve as a safety valve whereby people could vent their grievances.”

Appeals Court upholds conviction of Alexandrian political activist

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English edition 
October 17, 2010

A misdemeanor appeal court today upheld an earlier verdict that convicted a political activist of assaulting and libeling a policeman, but reduced the prison sentence from six months to one month.

“My case is fabricated from start to finish. This verdict is not issued by the judiciary but by police authorities,” Hassan Mustafa, the convict, told Al-Masry Al-Youm in a phone interview from the Mediterranean city of Alexandria where the trial was held.

Mustafa was first arrested in mid-June on grounds of beating and defaming lieutenant colonel Khaled Mohsen in Alexandria.  A couple of days later, the court sentenced him to six months in prison and ordered a fine of LE2000 Egyptian Pounds. Eventually, the 28-year-old activist appealed the verdict, contending that the allegations were fabricated.

Earlier, Mustafa had filed a compliant against another policeman for beating, and dragging him on the ground during a demonstration protesting the notorious murder of Khaled Saeed. Mustafa was on his way to undergo forensic examination when policeman Mohsen intercepted him and leveled accusations against him, according to Mustafa’s lawyers.

“Authorities are sharpening their teeth and using all dishonest means to deter and terrorize political activists,” said Mustafa, who is an active member of  the Popular Democratic Movement for Change (PDMC)--a nascent opposition group that voices socio-economic grievances and denounces the regime of President Hosni Mubarak.

“By virtue of this verdict, the police can chase me or raid my house to take me to jail,” added Mustafa, who was released on bail last summer.

At press time, Mustafa had decided to pre-empt any attempt to stop him, by turning himself in to the police station. “I will not give [the police] the chance to use this verdict to come to my house and terrify my parents. In the meantime, I am not a criminal to let them chase me,” Mustafa told Al-Masry Al-Youm.

The Court of Cassation, which is Egypt’s supreme court of appeal, is Mustafa’s last resort. Yet, even a new appeal might not be resolved soon enough to keep him free, according to lawyers.

“Practically, it will be hard for him to evade jail because by the time the appeal is accepted, Mustafa will have already spent his one-month sentence,” said Haitham Mahamadeen, a lawyer from the Nadim Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, which had delegated attorneys to defend Mustafa.

Legally, Mustafa’s lawyers have the right to submit a petition to the General Prosecutor requesting a suspension of the sentence until the new appeal is resolved on grounds that the convict has a clean record, said Mohamadeen. But the chances that the general prosecutor accepts this petiton are slim, he added.

"The General Prosecutor will refuse it for political reasons, because the case involves a policeman," said Mohamadeen.

Photo: By Tareql Elfaramawy

Farouk Gouida’s Raping a Country: A rant about misappropriation of public properties

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English edition
October 13, 2010

The title of journalist and poet Farouk Gouida’s recent book--Raping a Country: Crimes of Land Pillaging in Egypt--might suggest that it is a solid piece of extensive research that dissects and contextualizes a notoriously corrupt trend that, in recent years, has attracted a lot of attention.  Unfortunately, the content does not rise to that level of sophistication. “Raping a Country” is only a compilation of opinion columns published over the last five years that, lacking formal research, rely heavily on anecdote and are often clouded by Gouida’s poetic style.

In the 41 columns, the well-known journalist lists several incidents of public properties being appropriated to foreign and Egyptian businessmen in suspicious deals. Gouida dismisses the government as “a real estate broker.”

“The government has focused all its economic activities on selling state-owned assets,” writes Gouida. “Land has become the only good on which to speculate and conclude transactions. It is surrounded by a lot of suspicion and I do not understand why we do not take a stand vis-a-vis this serious chaos.”

The book is laden with national ethos. More than half of the articles are dedicated to foreign, particularly Israeli, attempts to acquire land in the Sinai peninsula, a region fully occupied by Israel for six years. In one piece, Gouida writes about a Zionist project that aims to annex 600 square kilometers in Sinai to the Gaza Strip. Palestinians could claim the land, giving away their territories in the West Bank.
“We should not think that Israel has become a nice dove that wants peace and security all of a sudden. We would be committing an injustice to ourselves if we assumed that Israel wants our prosperity and happiness,” he writes.

Raping a Country could not have hit the market at a better moment. The saga surrounding the selling of 8000 feddans to the Talaat Mostafa Group has made headlines in the local press for the last few weeks. The coverage gained momentum after the court declared that the transaction violated Egyptian law by selling the land to the company without calling for a prior auction. Ultimately, the president intervened and ordered the formation of a legal commission to address the issue.

And earlier this summer, yet another example of suspicious land deals stirred public outrage, when the government was forced to deal with accusations of misappropriation of public land to a company co-owned by Minister of Housing Ahmed El-Maghraby.  The Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics stated that the purchasing company under-priced the state-owned land by LE23 million. Again, the president intervened and cancelled the deal.

The book does not tackle these two cases, but it addresses the marriage between power and money, arguing for an immutable divorce. Gouida wonders, “Why is there an insistence to mix government responsibilities and business?”
In his article, “A Disengagement is Required,” the author discusses the appropriation of 127 feddans in the western suburbs of Cairo to a non-governmental organization formed by Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif and a group of businessmen when Nazif was still a communications minister. The books alleges that the NGO received the land, on which they planned to build a private university, without paying. The author contends that the NGO received far more land than necessary. “It is so unjust to appropriate all this space of 127 feddans for one university that won’t use more than ten feddans,” Gouida writes.

Not content with merely questioning Nazif’s activities, Gouida looks back to Nazif’s prior involvement in similarly flawed deals. In more than one article, Gouida shows how former Prime Minister Atef Ebeid--who spearheaded the privatization of Egypt’s land--conducted irregular transactions that cost the country millions of dollars. The book highlights the notorious case of the Egyptian-Italian businessman Waguih Siag who, in 2003, successfully sued the Egyptian government for US$133 million. More than 160 feddans of land in the Sinai had been appropriated to Siag to build a resort. But when the government found out that Siag’s project was partially financed by Israelis, they repossessed the land.

The government ended up compensating Siag a paltry sum. Gouida worries about the lack of accountability from officials like Ebeid. “Is the case going to be over by just compensating Siag? Does not the matter require investigating and questioning senior officials who were implicated in this tragedy?”

Gouida directs his wrath toward prime ministers and other senior state officials but refrains from putting any blame on the ruling regime or President Mubarak in particular, during whose era large-scale privatization deals have been marred by corruption. On the contrary, the author portrays the president as a messianic figure who intervenes at the last minute to fix all wrongs and prevent the squandering of public properties by his ministers. Gouida conveniently ignores the fact that these officials were selected and appointed by the president himself.

Gouida also fails to highlight the role of the President’s son, Gamal Mubarak, in deepening the overlap between business and politics. Gamal continuously spearheads neo-liberal policies and remains the rallying figure of Egyptian businessmen. Since 2004, he has successfully brought members of his business entourage in to run the cabinet, many of whom were entrusted with ministerial portfolios that help their businesses. By avoiding any explicit criticism of the president and his son, the author walks a fine line between exposing corruption and antagonizing the ruling regime. The fact that most of the articles compiled were originally published in the state-owned Al-Ahram newspaper may explain this cautious strategy.

Because he is a poet, Gouida’s style tends to be more sentimental than informative. The author’s energy goes to expressing his disenchantment in stylized prose and poetry rather than providing elaborate data on the phenomenon of land misappropriation. Consequently, the book lacks vital information like when land sales began, what kind of policies encouraged it, and what political and economic reasons stood behind the boom. In the end, “Raping the Country,” is more of a rant, possessing spirit but little real information.