Sunday, June 3, 2012

Profile: Nour spokesman Nader Bakkar struggles to fight niche appeal of party

Originally published in Egypt Independent May 2012   On Friday morning, Nader Bakkar, wearing a white robe, ascends to a mosque pulpit and delivers a sermon to worshippers performing weekly congregational prayers. During the rest of the week, Bakkar dons a business suit and a necktie and visits the studios of satellite television channels to speak on nightly talk shows. With his soft voice and calm temper, Bakkar has seized such media platforms to diffuse stereotypes about Salafis and represent the views of the Nour Party, the country’s largest Salafi party. In only a few months, his TV appearances coupled with his newspaper columns turned him into a Salafi public figure. Challenging media prejudice "I represent a generation of educated and well-read youth who work for international organizations. I belong to the internet generation,” Bakkar, a member of the Nour Party’s High Board, tells Egypt Independent during an extensive interview recently. “The media has always preferred not to present this profile and focused on the repulsive, backward Salafi, who believes that everything is haram. I try to challenge this stereotype.” Part of him shaking the stereotype is highlighting that his mother is a working woman and that he has no intention to challenge his wife's right to work after she completes her undergraduate studies at pharmacy school.   “Who has said that women's work is haram?” says Bakkar, adding that a woman can take any profession that would “respect her.” "She can be a journalist, a doctor, a teacher…” says Bakkar. Although his mother and wife wear the niqab, Bakkar says he believes a Muslim woman is not obliged by Islamic Sharia to cover her face. Since the fall, the 27-year-old preacher-politician has risen to the fore as a spokesperson for the Salafi party who seeks to build bridges with other political forces but refuses to make concessions on his Salafi ideology. "There is a lot in common between us and others,” he says. “We share a whole country all together.” "It is not smart to keep looking for differences with others but to search for what is common. However, searching for a common ground does not mean that I give up my fundamentals,” says Bakkar. These fundamentals include the pursuit of a constitution that broadens the scope of Islamic Sharia. Bakkar's party is expected to push for a rewording of the old constitution's stipulation that the principles of Islamic Sharia are the primary source of legislation. Bakkar hopes to substitute “commandments” for “principles.” “It (the old constitution) tightens the scope of Sharia a lot,” he says. Bakkar also hopes that the new order will grant Al-Azhar's Islamic Research Academy the right to vet any bill that requires a religious opinion. The Nour Party holds more than 20 percent of post-Mubarak parliamentary seats and stands as the second largest parliamentary bloc after the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. However, the Nour Party’s core principles are expected to trigger the outrage of secularists who fear the creation of a religious state Embracing Salafism as a student Bakkar was born in Alexandria in 1984 to a father who worked as an Arabic teacher and a mother who still works as a clerk at the state notary.   As a sophomore at Alexandria University's Faculty of Commerce, he was introduced to Salafi thought. He says the 2003 US invasion of Iraq was the trigger to embrace Salafism, a school of thought advocating a literal interpretation of Islam. “The Iraq war had shocked me and made me feel that Islam was the target,” remembers Bakkar. “I started going regularly to the mosque and attending religious lessons.” Back then, he was particularly attracted to the famous Salafi preacher Mohamed Ismail al-Mokadem, one of the leaders of the Salafi Dawah, which is based in Alexandria. Eventually, Bakkar joined the Salafi Dawah. Under President Hosni Mubarak, Bakkar’s Salafi activities were confined to local mosques. For almost eight years, he has been delivering sermons to worshippers in the Mediterranean city’s mosques, a practice that he believes has prepared him for his current political role. “Preaching has given me the ability to deal confidently with the media,” says Bakkar. Like all Salafis, he remained aloof from politics before the 25 January revolution. “We believed that we should not participate in politics because there were actually no politics. Participating would have been a form of deceiving the people and improving the image of the regime,” says Bakkar, in an oblique reference to Mubarak’s authoritarian regime that allowed opposition parties to exist and engage in elections for window-dressing. But Mubarak’s ouster encouraged Bakkar and thousands of Salafis to join the world of partisan politics for the first time. "I was convinced then that we should prove that the Salafi idea could be applied to different aspects of life,” says Bakkar. “So I felt that I should contribute.” Along with some 5,000 other Salafis, he co-founded the Nour Party, which is the political arm of the Salafi Dawah. Bakkar believes that his previous professional experience as an executive manager at a regional healthcare company and the several diplomas he earned in management and governance armed him with the necessary skills to contribute to building a political party. “My work has taught me how to make decisions and to run a team, and this is politics,” says Bakkar, who co-owns and runs an Alexandria-based company that promotes “strategic management.”   In the lead-up to the 2011 parliamentary elections, Bakkar rose as one of the party’s prominent and influential leaders, despite his young age. According to Ahmed Shalata, an expert on the Salafi movement, Bakkar’s ascent is not necessarily evidence of his precocity as much as a reflection of the party’s generational dynamics. “There is a very large segment of young people within the Salafi Dawah and the Nour Party. The rise of Bakkar at that age is related to the fact that the party has imposed a 20 percent quota for young members [below 35] in senior offices,” says Shalata. Bakkar’s strong ties with Yasser Borhamy, the vice-president of the Salafi Dawah, and Emad Abdel Ghaffour, the Nour Party’s president, also helped him assume such a prominent position within the party, added Shalata. Apologizing for Nour Since Parliament was sworn in, Salafi MPs have at times shocked liberals and observers with incendiary statements that invoked the Islamic Sharia. On the day the People’s Assembly was sworn in, Nour party MPs insisted on adding religious references to the official oath. Later on, some Nour MPs made controversial statements that were taken as evidence of their inexperience and political recklessness. A Salafi lawmaker accused revolutionary groups of consuming drugs and serving foreign agendas during the clashes that erupted between protesters and the police outside the Interior Ministry in the wake of the football riots that left more than 70 people killed in Port Said in February. The comment was widely seen as politically insensitive and opened the door for the party to be grouped in with counter-revolutionary forces. Later, another Nour MP called for stopping English language instruction in Egyptian schools, arguing that it could westernize children. That kind of statement is unlikely to come from someone like Bakkar, who studied commerce in Alexandria University's English-language division. On some of these occasions, Bakkar had emerged as the party’s apologist. In both social and conventional media, Bakkar apologized on behalf of his party for such attitudes, contending that they did not represent the party’s true line of thought. “I totally understand that some [Nour MPs] used a certain language that was not political or diplomatic enough,” admits Bakkar, who contends that as time passed, the performance of Nour MPs has improved.   Many pundits saw Bakkar's recurrent apologies as an indicator of a lack of cohesion among Nour’s members, a criticism Bakkar vehemently opposes. “This matter was overblown in order to hurt my and the party’s images,” he says. “I only apologized three times and these occasions were few and far between. But the matter was portrayed in a certain manner to show that our performance is a failure.” “You could speak of internal differences if there was a verbal war between members,” he says. Accusations of lack of uniformity would have been true, “had any Nour MP come out and told me it was none of my business and that I had no right to apologize." Hesham Abouel Nasr, a former leader of the Nour party, might have a slightly different account. He pointed out that Bakkar bypassed the party’s leadership on some occasions in which he commented the performance of Nour MPs. “Bakkar has a charisma and despite his young age, he could be the party’s spokesperson. I consider him a very important figure. Yet, there were few incidents in which he acted with some recklessness,” said Abouel Nasr, a former member of the party's High Board. "Bakkar made some announcements without consulting with the party’s High Board first…He had said once that we would interrogate one of the MPs and this had pissed us off,” added Abouel Nasr, who quit the party earlier this year on grounds that Egyptian society is not ready for an Islamist take-over. The 45-year-old intensive care physician by training preferred to return to preaching in order to propagate the Salafi message further and prepare society for a future Islamist ascent. Double hats Bakkar's engagement in politics never comes at the expense of his role as a preacher. Since Mubarak's fall and the dismantling of his notorious state security apparatus which used to harass Salafi religious leaders, Bakkar, the sheikh, says he has branched outside Alexandria. Videos of him delivering sermons in different provinces are available on the internet. While he takes pride in his political and religious talents, some experts dismiss this dualism as evidence of the Nour Party's failure to draw a line between proselytizing and political activities. “This is a big crisis that the party has to overcome,” says Shalata. “The sheikh mentality still controls many of the party's men.” Shalata adds that most Nour Party leaders deliver Friday sermons and give religious lessons in mosques. The leaders' religious outlook prompts them to judge situations according to their conformity with Islam rather than the benefit or the harm they could inflict on the country, Shalata argues. 

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Arab Novel Forum a 'waste of money' according to Al-Aswany

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English Edition
December 2010

As the International Forum for Arab Novel Creativity is nearing an end, prominent novelist Alaa Al-Aswany voices incendiary criticism of the endeavor dismissing it as “a waste of public money”.

“This is a farce? Has the forum ever improved the Arab novel? Novels would  improve only when individual novelists can write good novels in their houses... We do not have to spend millions that come from Egyptian taxpayers,” said Al-Aswany.

The government-sponsored forum opened its fifth round under the title “The Arab Novel: Where is it Going?” earlier this week with the participation of 250 novelists and literary critics. Ninety participants came from around 19 different Arab countries to engage in extensive discussions on the future of the Arab novel.

For the last four days, prominent authors and commentators have been debating many aspects of novel writing. Their talks have touched on timely and controversial  issues such as the portrayal of women in Arab novels, feminist creative writing, the future of the Saudi novel and the impact of religion on literature.

“You rarely find good research,” said Al-Aswany who participated once in the forum back in the late 1990s.  “All this research can be conducted at universities.”

With his award-winning “Yacoubian Building,” Al-Asway is honored as one of the most talented contemporary Egyptians novelists. His novel, with its unflattering portrayal of Egypt’s society and politics, was translated into several languages and went into multiple printings. The author is also a well-established columnist. In recent years, he has risen as one of the staunchest critics of President Hosni Mubarak’s rule.

For Emad Abou Ghazi, the Secretary General of the Supreme Cultural Council, universities cannot play the same role as forums.

“This is a narrow-minded look,” Abou Ghazi told Al-Masry Al-Youm. “Universities do not play this role, they do not hold large conversations where a large number of creative thinkers get together.”

“These forums allow Egypt to maintain its cultural ties with the Arab world,” said Abou Ghazi, adding that more Arab countries are in competition with Egypt to prove themselves as the region’s cultural pivots.

“We are protecting and extending Egypt’s cultural role in light of ongoing fierce competition,” he said. “Competition is coming from many rather than only one Arab country.”

He contended that allocating public money to such cultural activities is accepted worldwide. “Many countries in the world dedicate some of their budgets to culture and consider it an addition to their diplomatic and political power,” he added.

The Arab Novel Forum was first launched in Cairo in 1998. At the last day of each convention, one novelist is awarded a prize worth LE100,000. In previous years, the award went to high-ranking writers  including Abdel Rahman Munif from Saudi Arabia, Al-Tayeb Saleh from Sudan and Edward Kharrat from Egypt. This year’s winner is set to be announced at the closing ceremony later tonight.

Many prominent writers second Abou Ghazi on the importance of the forum, which is held every two to three years.

“Forums are a good opportunity for Arab writers to meet and exchange ideas,” said author Gamal Al-Ghitani.  “Spending money on cultural events where respectable Arab writers are invited--isn’t that better than wasting public money on other stuff?” Al-Ghitani asked.

He listed names of highly influential authors who are in town for the conference including Olweyya Sobh from Lebanon, Aminr Tag Al-Sir from Sudan, Mohamed Al-Ashaary from Morocco, among others.

For his part, Bahaa Taher, Arabic Booker winner, intimated that the government is already not spending enough on culture. “The state spends on culture one tenth of what it spends on football and TV,” said Taher, who chaired one of the panels at this year’s forum.

Several opposition leaders protest 'void' parliament

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English Edition
December 2010


Flags of different colours and copies of the Quran were raised Sunday in downtown Cairo where nearly five hundred secular and Islamist demonstrators rallied to protest the newly formed “illegitimate” parliament surrounded by thousands of riot police. 


For almost two hours, supporters of various official and non-official opposition factions kept flooding to the scene echoing the same slogans:”The People's Assembly is void”, “Hosni Mubarak is illegitimate”, “Down with Hosni Mubarak”. 


“All political factions are here to announce the illegitimacy of the ruling regime,” Gamal Fahmi, a prominent writer and an outspoken critic of the regime, told Al-Masry Al-Youm on the sidelines of the protest. “These shameless elections were the final nail in this regime’s coffin.”


The protest comes on the heels of a parliamentary poll that was marred by several electoral violations including ballot stuffing in favor of ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates and the intimidation of non-NDP voters, according to local and international observers.


For his part President Mubarak, who also serves as the NDP president, said Sunday that the elections were lawful for the most part while acknowledging few irregularities. He related his party’s smashing victory to “good preparation and organization”.


The NDP came out of last week’s poll with nearly 80 percent of parliament's 508 contested seats, leaving no more than 15 seats to official opposition parties. As for the banned-but-tolerated Muslim Brotherhood, it came out of the race without any victory. By contrast, the Islamist group held one fifth of the seats in the outgoing parliament. As the results came out, the opposition contended that the new parliament should be dissolved.


“My presence here today is part of the Wafd party’s efforts to escalate the confrontation with [the regime],” Rami Lakkah, a leader of the liberal Wafd party, told Al-Masry Al-Youm. 


“This escalation will continue until we oust this parliament, which came into being thanks to vote rigging and thuggery,” added Lakkah as he stood near his party’s flapping green flags.


Like all opposition groups, the elections dealt a blow to the Wafd party. In the first round, only two of the party’s more than 200 candidates secured seats, which provoked the Wafd to announce its full boycott of the run-off. Members who defied the party’s decision and engaged in the second race had their membership frozen last week.


Lakkah was one of many prominent opposition leaders who engaged fervently in the protest. Also in attendance were George Ishak and Abdel Halim Qandil from Kefaya; Osama Ghazali Harb, the president of the Democratic Front Party; Ayman Nour from Al-Ghad party; and Mohamed El-Beltagui from the Muslim Brotherhood. Some were raised on the shoulders of their supporters to shout slogans expressing their full disenchantment with the ruling regime.


For some protesters, Mohamed Elbaradei, the new rallying symbol for opposition, should have joined these key figures.


“His presence today would have been very important,” said 27-year-old Amr Ezz. “He could have mobilized a much bigger number of people because many of his supporters are waiting for him to take to the street so they can follow.”


On his part, Ahmed Maher, coordinator of the youth-based opposition group April 6, showed some understanding of Elbaradei’s reluctance to engage in such a protest.
“His presence in such small protests would not be beneficial,” said Maher. “As a symbol, Elbaradei should only appear in big demonstrations, and he said he would take to the street when there is at least 100,000 protesters in order to have a strong influence.”


Many observers hold that mobilizing such large numbers is hard for Egypt’s “elitist” opposition to achieve, as it falls short from operating at a grassroots level.


In February Elbaradei, a Nobel Prize Laureate, made news after expressing his willingness to run for president if real multiparty elections were held. Many young activists built momentum around this statement and threw their full backing behind the former head of the UN nuclear watchdog. A few weeks later, the National Association for Change was created under his auspices to advance seven reform demands, including the lifting of the state of emergency and a package of constitutional amendments. Yet Elbaradei-inspired groups were racked by divisions which some blamed on his continuous absence.


Elbaradei left Egypt in September, and returned last week to Cairo. Before his arrival, he posted a video online in which he dismissed the parliamentary elections, accusing the regime of “killing all opportunities for change.” He reiterated his threats to resort to civil disobedience in order to demand his reforms, but they continue to be ignored by the regime.

Ruling party's grip on parliament could trigger violence, opposition warns

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English Edition
December 2010

After the first round of the Egypt’s parliamentary elections delivered a sweeping victory to President Hosni Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), the embattled opposition and analysts alike contend peaceful pressure no longer provides a legitimate avenue to political reform.

Those critical of status quo political conduct in Egypt say violent options may now be on the table.

“The NDP sent a message to voters that any hope for change by peaceful means is not conceivable,” said Hussein Abdel Razek, a leading member of the leftist Tagammu party. “Unfortunately, the threat of violence and explosions is conceivable in light of people’s despair.” 

Human rights organizations echoed suggestions of impending unrest. 

“This parliament does not give any hope to anyone to engage in the political process,” said Bahey el-Din Hassan, director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. “It tells Egyptians 'give up politics, go commit suicide, leave the country or resort to violence'.”

According to official results, the NDP secured nearly all of the seats decided in Sunday's first round, leaving only a handful of positions to officially-recognized opposition parties.

The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s strongest opposition force, came out of Sunday's race virtually empty-handed. The group, which secured nearly one-fifth of the seats in the 2005 election, may have no voice in the next People’s Assembly. Brotherhood leaders are torn over whether to field candidates in the upcoming run-off poll.

“Everything built on falsehood is illegitimate," Mohamed Badie, the Muslim Brotherhood’s supreme guide, told reporters on Tuesday. "These elections are illegitimate in almost all districts."

“We continue on our peaceful path. We won't let anyone lead us into a violent reaction that is against the law or constitution,” he added.

Marginalizing the Brotherhood will not push the 83-year-old organization into violence, analysts suspect, but could eventually close down any venues for political venting.   

"Violence is not expected from any party or even the Muslim Brotherhood," commented Abdel Razek. "I am talking about disorganized masses that may engage in spontaneous violence and explosions."

In recent years, thousands of workers engaged in a series of labor strikes and protests over better economic conditions, placing tremendous pressure on the ruling party. The highpoint of this wave was the April 2008 protests that erupted in the Delta province of Mahalla. 

Tagammu secured only one seat in the first round. Its liberal bourgeois-based contender Wafd party is in a similarly poor position, as it claimed only three seats. 

“Egypt is going back to the single party system that does not accept divergent views or opposition and this is not in the best interest of the country,” said Ali al-Salmi, assistant chairman of Wafd.

Yet, for the regime’s supporters, the opposition’s outcry holds no currency.

“The first round is a good democratic start,” said Magdi al-Daqqaq, editor of the state-owned October magazine. “Unfortunately, in Egypt as well as in other third world countries, we do not have the election culture. While losers should acknowledge their defeat and congratulate winners, they keep talking about rigging and thuggery.”

According to al-Daqqaq, the NDP's triumph attests to the party’s strong social base.

“It was expected that the NDP will get the majority of seats,” he said. “This is a logical and natural result for a party that is connected with people and has achievements.”

The run-off set for this Sunday is not expected to enhance the position of non-NDP candidates by any significant measure. The Muslim Brotherhood candidates are expected to stand a second race over 26 out of nearly 280 seats that are yet to be decided. As for Wafd and Tagammu, their nominees can still vie for only 9 and 6 seats respectively.

Most of the run-off races will be fought between NDP candidates, as the party fielded more than one nominee per seat in more than 100 districts.

“Going on with this game is not useful,” said al-Salmi. “No matter how many seats non-NDP candidates will get, [the number] will be of no value and will not lead to the formulation of any opposition in parliament.”

The ideal option is to withdraw from the run-off, al-Salmi said.

For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood on Tuesday hinted that it might boycott the second round in protest over electoral violations committed against its candidates.

On Sunday, nearly 5000 candidates competed over 508 seats. The race was marred by violence, that reportedly left 16 killed, and fraud allegations. The opposition claimed their representatives were not allowed to monitor the poll while their supporters were denied access to the ballot box.

Moreover, many journalists faced police harassment and intimidation while covering violations. Monitors were not allowed to enter polling centers in many districts, as well.

“The whole thing is an ugly joke,” said Samer Shehata, a political scientist with Georgetown University, who is currently in Egypt to follow the poll. “It is a travesty of what elections are supposed to be. There was no resemblance of free and fair elections.”

And criticism of electoral conduct is not restricted to Egyptian analysts and politicians. The US State Department voiced concern over “irregularities” that accompanied the poll.

"We are disappointed by reports in the pre-election period of disruption of campaign activities of opposition candidates and arrests of their supporters, as well as denial of access to the media for some opposition voices," US State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said.

To Shehata, these words are not enough to pressure Egypt to reform.

“There are not very harsh condemnations;" said Shehata. "The State Department expressed some serious concern and reservations but at the end it was not the Secretary of State or the White House press person or [Barack] Obama himself who is making the criticism.”

“It is a slap on the wrist and if the regime gets away with it, it is a very small price to pay for a fraudulent election,” he added.

Pope's ballot triggers doubts about future of regime-church relationship

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English Edition
December 2010

In the midst of the abundant flow of reports about electoral violence and allegations of vote rigging, news about the pope’s backing of the Wafd party nominee stood out by raising questions about a potential shift in the Church’s decades long support of the ruling National Democratic Party.

The church has made no official announcement concerning what party appeared on the pope’s ballot. However, Naguib Gobraiel, the church’s lawyer, confirmed that the ruling party’s reluctance to field a considerable number of Coptic candidates, coupled with violent clashes erupting in southern Cairo, must be the driving force behind Pope Shenouda’s III decision to refrain from backing the ruling party.

“It is not logical to vote for a party that opened fire at [Copts], marginalized them and let them down,” Gobraiel told Al-Masry Al-Youm. 

The Coptic minority constitutes nearly ten percent of Egypt's population of 80 million. Copts frequently complain of religious discrimination including legal restrictions on the construction of churches and an alleged ceiling on the number of Copts permitted to attain high public office.

This week's poll came on the heels of sectarian violence that rocked Giza last week.

In an unprecedented move, thousands of Copts took to the streets to hurl Molotov cocktails and stones at the police in protest over the suspension of construction at a local church. Police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets that killed two Christians.

For his part, the 87-year-old pope blamed the violence on local authorities, reportedly warning them in his weekly sermon, “God is patient but when He gets angry, His anger can be scary.” A few days after uttering these words, the Coptic patriarch cast his ballot in support of the Christian candidate Rami Lakkah who ran under the liberal Wafd party’s banner for a professional seat in a northern Cairo district, affirmed Gobraiel.

According to Karima Kamal, a Coptic columnist, Pope Shenouda’s ballot marks a new episode in the evolving relationship between the regime and the church. To Kamal, the violence that broke out in Upper Egypt earlier this year precipitated a relative fallout between the two parties.

“The Church used to have the feeling that the ruling regime and the NDP were protecting it against the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis,” said Kamal, adding that the church once encouraged Copts to support the NDP.
“But what happened in Naga Hammadi showed that this protection does not exist.”

The year began with a drive-by shooting that left six Copts dead outside a church in the southern province of Naga Hammadi. Worshippers were coming out of the Coptic Christmas eve mass last January when violence broke out.

Additionally, the run-up to the poll was marred by Coptic disappointment with the NDP nomination of only 10 Copts on its official list. Adding fuel to the fire, the NDP fielded Abdel Rahim al-Ghoul, an NDP member of the outgoing parliament whom Copts implicated in last year’s violence in Upper Egypt.

“The nominations were quite comical,” said Kamal. “Copts do not have the same loyalty to the NDP anymore and the Pope cannot any ask them to vote for the NDP any longer.”

“I expect the relationship between the church and the regime to witness more divisions in the coming period,” she added.

Yet, for Kamal Zakher, a prominent Coptic writer, the pope’s ballot does not hold political overtones. “It is not about him voting for Al-Wafd, it is more about him voting for a Christian candidate. This vote cannot have any political dimensions.”

The pope is too “diplomatic” to escalate tensions with the ruling regime, contended Zakher.

“The pope has faced many crises since 1971 until 2010. This makes him cautious,” added Zakher.

The state has co-opted The Coptic Church since the 1952 military coup. The Patriarch Kirollos VI was held to represent the Coptic community and promoted loyalty to the state among his followers.

In 1971, Shenouda III was ordained pope near the same time Anwar Sadat became president. By the time of Sadat’s assassination, the relationship between the regime and the church witnessed a drastic shift.

In response to Sadat's policies that emboldened Islamist groups and culminated in the eruption of sectarian violence, the Church began to embrace anti-establishment discourse.

Eventually, Sadat put the pope under house arrest at the Monastery of Saint Bishoy where he remained for three years. The experience of detention marked a turning point in the Pope's strategy vis-à-vis the state, according to experts.

Upon his release by Mubarak in 1981, Shenouda repaired relations with the ruling regime and expressed Church support of President Mubarak in presidential races.

“Any attempt to reproduce the scenario of 1981 by any of the two parties [ruling regime and church] will lead to the eruption of violence on a large scale,” said Nabil Abdel Fattah, an expert with Al-Ahram center for Political and Strategic Studies.

“Neither the state nor the church want things to reach that level,” added Abdel Fattah.

In the midst of sectarian strains, the US State Department issued an annual report on religious freedom in Egypt earlier this month. The report lashed out at Egypt for discriminating against religious minorities, including Copts.

The criticism came at a time when the ruling regime is preoccupied with Western concern over electoral violations that marred this week's parliamentary race.

"The moment is ripe for Copts to exercise pressure," said Abdel Fattah. He was reluctant, however, to pledge Copts will succeed in gaining increased civil rights. "The state will heed few of the Coptic demands ahead of the presidential elections."

NDP nominations set precedent, expose internal rifts

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Masry English Edition
November, 2010

In an unprecedented move in the history of party systems, Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) is fielding multiple candidates for the same seat in more than a hundred districts in the parliamentary poll set for 28 November.

On Sunday, the NDP dropped a bombshell that challenged conventional political wisdom with the announcement of its final candidates list that included nearly 850 contenders for 508 parliamentary seats. In nearly 150 districts, the NDP fielded at least two candidates for the same seat.

“This is a catastrophe,” said Amr Hashim, an expert with Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS). “I do not know where they came up with that idea, we have never heard of it before, nor have we read about it in any books.”

Yet, for NDP supporters, this decision is part of a well-deliberated plan to accommodate all party members that scored high in the primaries.

“With this disciplined plurality, the party has accommodated all social forces which can influence the elections…especially in rural districts where family and tribal ties are present,” wrote Abdullah Kamal, an NDP member and editor of the state-owned Rose-Al-Youssef daily, yesterday.

On the same day, another staunch NDP defender Mohamed Ali Ibrahim hailed the party’s decision as democratic.

“The party found that some candidates achieved similar results in the primaries. If the party had favored one candidate over the other, it would have been a sign of dictatorship...This [decision] is an example of ultimate democracy,” he wrote yesterday in Al-Gomhuriyya, another government paper.

The announcement came on the heels of contentious NDP primaries held in different provinces, presumably to select candidates with the highest chances of winning. Yet, the final outcome overloaded the nation’s 254 constituencies with hundreds of NDP members. In several districts, the party’s official contenders has reached five.

Fielding multiple candidates for the same party carries the risk of splitting, rather than aggregating, the votes which can ultimately harm NDP candidates’ chances of winning. Yet, as there is no full judicial monitoring of the poll, Hashim expects the vote to be manipulated to ensure a sweeping victory for NDP candidates.

“This decision could have served the opposition if the elections had been fair and free. But this will not happen,” said Hashim.  “I expect the NDP to win an 85-percent majority given the absence of judicial supervision,. 

According to Amr el-Shobaki, another political scientist with ACPSS, even if the race is clean, NDP vote splitting cannot benefit the opposition, as the ruling party fielded multiple candidates only in districts where victory is a foregone conclusion.

“The NDP is confident that one of its candidates will win in these districts where there is no real competition with the opposition,” said el-Shobaki. “Opposition and Muslim Brotherhood candidates have no presence in these districts.”

On 7 November, the High Elections Commission stopped receiving applications from hopeful MPs. It announced the final list of 5725 candidates running for the parliament’s 508 contested seats, including 64 that are exclusively allocated for women. The number includes almost 850 from the NDP, 132 from the Muslim Brotherhood and 250 from the Wafd Party.

“The NDP does not want to upset anyone and this is why we ended up with an overload, not only of independent candidates but also NDP candidates,” added el-Shobaki.

In the last two elections, the NDP primaries were followed by feuds that culminated in tens of members breaking ranks with the party and running as independents. The 2000 election  was an embarrassment to the ruling party, especially after defectors defeated NDP official candidates. Winning only 39 percent of the seats, the NDP had to re-integrate 181 independents into the party to secure a two-thirds majority .

The party faced the same dilemma in 2005 when its official candidates won only 34 percent of the seats. The NDP resorted to the same tactic, readmitting nearly 160 victorious independent candidates.

By fielding multiple candidates for the same seat, the party seems determined to avoid such splits and embarrassments this year. Yet, even with this odd strategy, the NDP failed to stem divisions.

Ezzat Badawi, an NDPer at heart, had full faith in the selection criteria that party leaders preached. This confidence prompted him to apply for nomination in a Cairo district.

“They said the selection process would be fully transparent, impartial and democratic but we realized that words were different from actions,” said Badawi.

The party threw its backing behind a businessman with strong ties to the party’s leadership, he alleges.
“They chose a candidate who is a big party donor and is known to have strong links with party elites,” added Badawi, who decided last week to resign from the NDP and run as an independent against the party’s official candidate.

If he wins, Badawi promises never to return to the NDP, as most victorious independents usually do.
“If I make it to the parliament as an independent, I will kept this status according to which people have chosen me,” he pledges.

Badawi is one of at least 50 NDP members who quit the party in objection to the candidates list. Disappointed with the outcome of the selection process, several NDP members have protested over their failure to secure party nomination. Some members reportedly vowed to throw their full backing behind the Muslim Brotherhood--the NDP’s main parliamentary foe.

According to experts, these feuds attest to the internal weakness of the NDP, which lacks all tenets of a strong political party.

“If the NDP were a party with a coherent political discourse and well-trained and loyal members, these members would have respected the party’s decision and not quit that easily,” said el-Shobaki.

According to Bahey el-din Hassan, director of Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, this abundance of NDP candidates will exacerbate electoral tensions and culminate in a more violent poll day.

“I expect violence to reach very high levels on election day, especially among NDP candidates because most them enjoy political or financial leverage and have strong tribal and family ties,” said Hassan.

In 2005, election violence perpetrated mostly by candidates’ supporters and thugs left 13 people dead.
The upcoming parliamentary poll comes one year ahead of the much-anticipated presidential elections, an event of critical importance given the uncertainty over the future of Egypt’s presidency. Skeptics doubt Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s 82-year-old president, will be able to run for a sixth term given his reportedly ill-health.

In the meantime, the ruling party seems divided between an old guard that opposes the rise of Mubarak’s son Gamal to the presidency and a younger camp that seeks to forward the former banker’s political career. In recent months, Gamal’s camp has been dealt a blow as top party leaders affirmed that Mubarak senior would be the party’s official candidate in 2011.

“This conflict between the two groups shapes all NDP activities,” said Hassan. “The NDP’s inability to select a single candidate in some districts is related to this conflict.” 

The party’s official list includes the regime’s old stalwarts, such as Ahmed Fathi Sorour, the speaker of the outgoing parliament, Zakariya Azmi, the influential presidential chief of staff, Kamal al-Shazly, former minister of state for People’s Assembly affairs, and Gamal’s protégé Ahmed Ezz, the NDP organization head and prominent steel tycoon. Yet, the list excludes three MP hopefuls who sponsored pro-Gamal campaigns in recent months.

“This is an indication that Gamal’s chances to succeed his father may be fading,” remarked Hassan.

Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh: A Witness to the History of Egypt’s Islamic Movement

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English Edition
November 2010


In the early 1970s, Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh was enrolled at Cairo University’s medical school. Back then, he did not approve of coeducation, music or watching football. The bearded young man dismissed all forms of entertainment as evil acts that distract Muslims from observing their faith. To propagate the message of Islam and establish an Islamic state, he did not even mind the use of violence.

This intransigent outlook was reversed a few years later upon his integration into the Muslim Brotherhood, and today Abou el-Fotouh is counted among the most open-minded Islamists whose political views are not shared by the wide majority of the nation’s oldest Islamic organization.

This change of heart is well-depicted in Abou el-Fotouh’s recent memoir,  Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh: A Witness to the History of Egypt’s Islamic Movement, published last month.

In only 150 pages, the high-ranking Islamist portrays a vivid picture of an exceptionally crucial moment in the history of Egypt’s Islamist groups: when thousands of radical students chose to join the relatively moderate Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, others held on to their revolutionary worldview, assassinating then-President Anwar Sadat in the hopes of resurrecting the political model of the Prophet’s times.

“Although Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh’s testimony comes in few pages, it serves as a concise history book for al-Jamaat al-Islameyya (Islamic Society) since they emerged in the 1970s in Cairo University’s medical school and spread to all of Egypt and other Arab countries,” writes Hossam Tamam, the book’s editor and a prominent expert on Islamism.

As a medical student, Abou el-Fotouh co-founded the first cell of al-Jamaat al-Islameyya. Disillusioned with President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s left-leaning secular project, Abou el-Fotouh and many of his cohorts sought refuge in religion in the wake of Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War.

“Holding session for the recitation of the Koran and writing religious advice on the wall were our most remarkable activities,” remembers Abou el-Fotouh. “Then, we went further and started writing prophetic traditions on blackboards. Later, we began writing political messages about unjust rulers and their accountability vis-à-vis God.” 

At many points in the book, Abou el-Fotouh fends off accusations that Islamist students had agreed to help President Sadat crush his communist foes who enjoyed strong leverage on Egyptian campuses. “I swear to God, we did not strike any deal with the regime or with anyone,” he says. “Yet, it is true that Sadat wanted and tried to control the Islamic movement at universities.”

Abou el-Fotouh’s mixed feelings toward Sadat, who jailed him and hundreds of his opponents one month before his murder, come through strongly in the text. While he dismisses Sadat’s rapprochement with the Israelis and his crackdown on Islamists, Abou el-Fotouh hails the era for its political freedom.

“Sadat’s era was distinguished by a level of freedom that Egypt had not seen since 1952. It was real freedom--freedom to work and not just to talk, unlike under President Mubarak. Mubarak allowed freedom of opinion but crushed the freedom of political activities,” he remembers.

At the time, Abou el-Fotouh did not appreciate “that level of freedom,” rather focusing on his frustration with Sadat’s policies. In 1977, Abou el-Fotouh’s frustrations manifested in a famous confrontation with the late president, during a meeting Sadat held with student union leaders. Abou el-Fotouh accused Sadat of targeting Muslim preachers and crushing student protests unlawfully in the wake of the 1977 bread riots. 

“I raised my hand many times to speak but he ignored me. I did not know why, so I went straight to the microphone without waiting for permission and spoke and my speech was quite cruel,” writes Abou el-Fotouh.

The 59-year-old activist documents how his group gradually developed a revolutionary agenda that condoned the use of violence to establish an Islamic order, which came about after delving into the writings of radical Muslim thinkers including Ibn Taymeyya, Abou al-Aala al-Mawdoudy and Sayyed Qotb.

“For us, state institutions contradicted the spirit of Islam and had to be eliminated. And an Islamic order had to be established instead,” writes Abouel Fotouh. “We believed that violence was permissible and also required in some instances to spread the message.”

He acknowledges the influence of Saudi Wahhabism on the group during its formative years. “Back then, we used to receive thousands of copies of Islamic books from Saudi Arabia. They were all gifts. They did not cost us anything.”

Abou el-Fotouh emphasises the moment of rupture between his old and new worldview. His self-critique is well demonstrated in the condescending tone he uses when talking about al-Jamaat al-Islameyya. Looking back, he condemns its members--himself included--as intransigent and intolerant Islamists who exercised “intellectual terrorism” against their secular counterparts.

This attitude was gradually amended after the group was invited to join the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s. The book offers an elaborate and precise account of this problematic integration, showing the level of secrecy that surrounded the co-opting of young Islamists by embattled Muslim Brotherhood leaders, released by Sadat after languishing for many years in Nasser’s prisons.

Abou el-Fotouh had his first meeting with a newly released Muslim Brotherhood leader in a shoe store. While pretending to try on shoes, the two interlocutors discussed possibilities of cooperation.

But this merger, far from proceeding smoothly, instigated divisions within al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya. Many members refused to join an organization they dismissed as not conservative enough. Eventually, the group split into two distinct entities.

According to the book, only a small minority chose to part ways with al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya by refusing to submit to the Muslim Brotherhood. “Those who swore allegiance to the Muslim Brotherhood constituted the majority of al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya leaders and rank and file,” Abou el-Foutouh writes. 

In recent years, Abou el-Foutouh has sought to promote liberal and democratic values within a highly conservative organization. In many interviews, he has contradicted the group’s official positions by stressing that women and Copts should have the right to run for president of a Muslim country. Last year, his exclusion, along with other moderate figures, from the group’s Guidance Bureau made headlines and spawned speculations that hawkish Islamists have gained full control of the nation’s oldest Islamic organization.

It is quite apparent that Abou el-Fotouh’s current views are not welcomed by the group’s leadership. Yet, his memoirs tend to sanctify the Muslim Brotherhood as if it was the guardian of moderate Islam. Throughout the text, he expresses his gratitude to the group’s leaders for the change of heart that he had gone through in the 1970s while failing to address the group’s problematic ideology as it stands today.

Egypt stifles traditionally tolerated Salafi outlets ahead of polls

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English Edition
October 2010

Within the last decade, bearded preachers have appeared on satellite channels in increasing numbers to stress the need to revive Islamic virtues and protect Islam against the hegemony of Western values. For five years, these clerics have shaped the discourse of the so-called Salafi channels and enjoyed a relatively peaceful relationship with the government.

This, however, no longer appears to be the case.

Earlier this month, the government announced the suspension of 12 satellite channels, mostly with religious themes. It also issued warnings to 20 other channels concerning their alleged "incitement to religious hatred, unlicensed medical advice and obscenity."

"These corrective measures are intended to protect the Egyptian and Arab peoples from broadcasters determined to make calls for murder, degradation of religious groups, and the endangerment of people living with serious illnesses--all in pursuit of profit and extremist ideologies," Information Minister Anas al-Fiqi declared earlier this month.

Nevertheless, Salafi television hosts described al-Fiqi’s allegations as groundless, claiming that the new measures were likely the result of western pressure.

“These are vague accusations. Words like 'terrorism,' 'extremism' and 'violence' are very loose and lack precision. There is no evidence to prove this,” said Mostafa Alazhary, official spokesman for the Al-Nas Salafi satellite channel, which has been suspended for the last two weeks.

“I suspect this suspension came about due to foreign pressures,” added Alazhary, who had previously hosted a show called “Forgotten Tears” for the station.

Al-Nas (Arabic for “the people”) stands as one of the most popular Salafi television stations in Egypt. The Saudi-owned station was first launched in early 2006, but with completely different content. The channel initially featured an eclectic collection of shows, themes of which included music, dance and dream interpretation. Later, the channel underwent a radical change in outlook by embracing religious programming and inviting some of the most popular Salafi preachers to host its programs. At the time of suspension, the channel was broadcasting some 30 shows that attracted millions of Muslim viewers, according to Alazhary.

Al-Rahma TV is another prominent Salafi channel to have been banned this month. Founded in 2007 by highly influential Salafi cleric Mohamed Hassan, the channel attracted a wide audience that sought to learn how to live as true Muslims and overcome everyday vices.

The ban comes on the heels of sectarian feuds that made headlines in the local press this summer. The reported conversion of a priest’s wife to Islam and her alleged re-conversion to Christianity triggered one such dispute. Tensions escalated shortly afterward when a leading Coptic Church official challenged the authenticity of certain Koranic verses. The incidents provoked dozens of Salafi-led demonstrations against the Coptic Church.

“The government wants to convey the message that it is extinguishing all fires ahead of [November] parliamentary elections,” said Ashraf al-Sherif, political science professor at the American University in Cairo. “It wants to give the impression that it is combating extremism regardless of whether these channels actually played a role in the sectarian strife witnessed over the summer.”

"What's more, the government wants to deter Salafis from speaking about politics," he added.

“The government may have concluded that the Salafis had deviated from the agreement they made with it earlier," al-Sherif added. "Recently, they've been talking about official corruption and broaching political topics, especially since Mohamed Hassan issued his fatwa  on the sales of antiquities.”

Salafi channels have traditionally been known for apolitical discourse that focuses only on Islamic principles.

But in early October, Hassan surprised observers with a controversial fatwa granting people the right to sell any antiquities they might find on their property. His detractors claimed he was inciting people to violate the law.

Precise demographics for the viewership of Salafi television programs remain uncertain. In fact, there are no reliable statistics available on the size of the Salafi movement in general. Analysts, however, believe the movement wields considerable influence in Egyptian mosques.

“It's hard to say what the main features of their audience are since the data to track these things doesn't exist in Egypt the way it does in the US,” said Nathan Field, co-author of a study entitled “Salafi Satellite TV in Egypt,” which appeared last year in the semi-academic journal Arab Media and Society. “My guess is that viewers tend to be middle and working class, generally the people who are not the elites of Egyptian society. However, many Egyptians seem to be attracted to charismatic clerics like Mohammed Hassan."

The recent bans on Salafi television channels represent only the latest episode in a more comprehensive crackdown in recent weeks that has targeted the private media in general. The crackdown kicked off with last month's suspension of the popular news talk show "Al-Qahira al-Youm" and continued with the sacking of Ibrahim Eissa, chief editor of independent daily Al-Dostour. Authorities soon after announced a ban on news alert cellphone text messages.

Many pundits have concluded that the new restrictions aim to silence Egypt's political opposition ahead of parliamentary elections set for next month.

“The suspension of Salafi channels is the dust that will cover up the upcoming heavy interference of the regime into the media,” said Hossam Tammam, an expert on Islamist groups.

“The ruling regime is approaching a decisive year that will determine its future. We will have the parliamentary elections followed by the presidential elections. It seems that the regime will not allow the same level of freedom it allowed during 2005 elections,” added Tamam.

The regime chose to begin by Salafi channels because the political cost of their suspension is quite negligible, explained Tamam.

“Salafi channels were the prime victims because they have serious flaws and dangerous implications on the society. We sensed this danger during the recent sectarian sedition,” he said.

According to al-Sherif, pleas by Salafi preachers to lift the ban will not fall on deaf ears.

“The government will not give up these channels," he said. "It will bring them back so they can serve as counterweights to the Muslim Brotherhood."

According to al-Sherif, the ruling regime has allowed Egypt's Salafi movement to persist in order to foster an apolitical version of Islam that could offset the model endorsed by the highly political Muslim Brotherhood.

“The Salafi movement is capable of influencing people’s minds," he said. "But this influence isn't politically dangerous since Salafis don't call for political activities."

The new restrictions have outraged Salafi clerics and prompted protests in Alexandria, a Salafi stronghold. One of the first responses to the restrictions came from prominent scholar Mohamed Hussein Yacoub.

“My heart is filled with sorrow and grief tonight,” said Yacoub in a televised speech posted on his website. “Muslims will lose a lot if these virtuous channels...remain closed,” he said. Yacoub implored authorities not to “deprive Muslims of the blessings of learning their religion and becoming closer to God.”

Tamam contended that owners of Salafi channels will eventually revisit their programs in order to survive in the market.

“At the end of the day, these channels are for business,” said Tamam. If investors find that the Salafi discourse will lead to drastic losses, they will change their channels.”

In recent decades, the term "Salafi" has been used to label groups and scholars that advocate the Hanbali legalistic tradition of Islam. The Wahhabi movement, which emerged in the 18th century in the Arabian peninsula, stands out as the earliest precursor of the Salafi tradition as seen today in the region.

“The Salafi channels have a narrow scope; they only focus on rituals and formalistic issues," said al-Sherif. "They aren't concerned with the question of how to integrate Islam into public life."

In an effort to convince the government to lift the suspension, Al-Nas TV has decided to diversify its content and reduce the number of programs devoted to religious topics.

“We're not going to change our outlook, but we will present religion in other forms,” said Alazhary, asserting that preaching and religious themes would now account for much less of the channel’s content.

“We were already thinking about making changes before they suspended the channel, but we didn't have time,” added Alazhary, whose channel was forced to lay off 80 percent of its 200 workers--and lost hundreds of thousands of Egyptian pounds--as a result of the ban.

“We haven't received any specific promises, but we've been assured that the channel would soon be allowed back," he said. "We just don't know when exactly."

Defense witness in Khaled Saeed's trial dismissed for violation of due process

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English Edition
23 October, 2010

The trial in Alexandria of the two secret policemen accused of beating Khalid Saeed to death has resumed with testimonies from witness from the prosecution and the defense.

The Alexandria Criminal Court listened to statements of nine witnesses from both sides for almost six hours before it decided to adjourn the hearing until 27 November.

The most startling event of today’s session was the disqualification of a defense witness for a violation of due process. Sherif Sami Mahmoud was inside the courtroom waiting to give testimony while another defense witness named Alaa al-Din Ali was giving evidence in favor of the defendants.

“The level of lies and fabrication in this case has become evident to the court,” Mahmoud Afifi, one of the victim's lawyers told Al-Masry Al-Youm. “It is clear that defense witnesses are coached and came today to recite what they were taught. They were left in the room to listen to each other’s statements”

By law, if there are multiple witnesses in a trial, they should not be inside the courtroom before they have given their statements. Only those who have already testified are allowed to stay. The court police are in charge of enforcing such regulations.

The chief forensic doctor in charge of writing the report which said that Saeed died of asphyxia after swallowing a roll of narcotics has yet to give evidence. In previous hearings, the victim’s lawyers insisted that al-Sabae Ahmed al-Sabae be summoned and questioned over his controversial report. Al-Sabae who was expected to testify today sent an apology saying he had to travel to India, according to Saeed’s attorneys.

In early June, the Khalid Saeed murder attracted widespread media attention and stirred the outrage of human rights groups both within Egypt and worldwide. The two policemen allegedly beat the 28-year-old man to death in the Mediterranean city of Alexandria. According to witnesses, he was dragged out of an internet cafe before having his head repeatedly banged on a solid surface. Saeed’s family have reportedly alleged that he was killed after posting a video on the internet which apparently showed police involved in drug deals.

Eventually, the policemen Mahmoud Salah Mahmoud and Awad Ismail Suleiman were referred to criminal court on charges that included illegal arrest and use of excessive force. Their trial began in July amid close scrutiny from human rights advocacy groups.

Saeed’s supporters took the police by surprise today by not rallying at the doorsteps of court as they have during past sessions. Instead, they held a protest near the Sidi Gaber police station where the two defendants served prior to their arrest this summer.

“We did not go to the court because [the police] usually bring hired thugs and impose a lot of restrictions on us,” Safwan Mohamed, a 30-year-old activist who was among the protestors told Al-Masry Al-Youm.

“In addition, we wanted to convey a message from the scene at the heart of the event. It was Sidi Gaber Police station that was behind the killing of Khaled Saeed,” added Mohamed.

For almost an hour, dozens of young men and women raised banners carrying Saeed’s picture while shouting slogans against the Mubarak regime and human rights abuses. They also sprayed the ground with slogans reading, “Down with Hosni Mubarak”.

Tuesday, November 9, 2010

Pundits divided over future of private media after recent crackdown

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English edition 
October 19, 2010

The recent crackdown on privately-owned Egyptian media has left many observers perplexed. The move is raising questions over whether the newly-imposed constraints are temporary measures--only aimed at silencing the media during the upcoming elections--or if they represent a radical shift in the government’s attitude towards independent media.

“To what extent is the regime taking it further? Is it just for the elections or is it more than that? Is the regime considering a new way of running the country?” questioned prominent writer and a history professor at Helwan University Sherif Younes.

“We can only make speculations because the main players responsible for these acts are secretive and unaccountable," he added. "We are ruled by a secret regime.”

The government launched the clampdown with the ban of the popular news talk show “al-Qahera al-Youm” last month. On the heels of the show's closing, Ibrahim Eissa, one of the staunchest critics of the ruling regime, was sacked from his position as editor-in-chief of the private daily Al-Dostour. His dismissal attracted a deluge of media attention, including fears that the Egyptian media landscape may lose a newspaper known for its inflammatory criticism of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).

Dina Shehata, a political expert with Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, believes these developments are aimed at more than just covering up expected electoral violations in the parliamentary poll slated for November. They signal the kickoff of a series of tougher restrictions that TV channels and newspapers will face from now until the presidential race set for fall 2011, Shehata predicts.

“They [the NDP] believe the independent media are their primary enemy,” said Shehata. “You can sense that in the NDP leaders’ discourse. They keep saying that the government is making achievements but the media do not make people sense them.”

The NDP is expected to field candidates for each of the 508 parliamentary seats set for contest. Alike 2005, this year's poll will feature at least 150 candidacies from the nation’s strongest and largest opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood. A verbal war already wages between the ruling party and the banned-but-tolerated Islamist group.  For many observers, this discursive standoff is expected to be the prelude to a violent and rigged electoral race.

“The 2010 elections will be a continuation of the second and third phases of the 2005 poll,” said Gamal Heshmat, member of the Musim Brotherhood’s Shura Council told Al-Masry Al-Youm, in reference to the electoral violence and fraud that pervaded the 2005 elections. Clashes over the polling claimed at least 13 lives.

“The NDP wants to deprive any force from meeting the eligibility requirements necessary to field a presidential candidate, ” he added.

As dictated by the 2007 constitutional amendments, an independent presidential hopeful has to garner the support of at least 250 elected members of the parliament’s lower and upper houses as well as municipal councils. Reaching such a number is next to impossible for a non-NDP candidate. The NDP continues to boast a sweeping majority in all legislative bodies.

In recent months, the independent media has been discussing the murky future of political succession as President Mubarak remains reluctant to appoint a vice-president despite reports of ill-heath. In the meantime, the private press has exposed reports of an alleged rift within the ruling regime over succession.

To Shehata, the cost of cracking down further on these private outlets would be nominal. “If a crackdown happens, are there any players that could get mobilized against it in a way that would pose a threat to the regime?” questioned Shehata rhetorically. “Only the US could voice criticism but the regime will not even listen to that unless it gets translated into actives measures against the government that could affect the aid for example.”

And using aid to deter the Egyptian government from tightening its grip on democratic institutions does not seem to be on the US government agenda. Last week, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) decided to increase its aid allocation for Egypt by 20 percent--to US$250 million.

The aid increase decision coincided with a Ministry of Communications announcement to impose restrictions on text messaging use in disseminating cellphone news alerts. And to add fuel to the fire, the Ministry of Information requested nine channels relocate their real-time coverage units to permanent offices at the Egyptian Media Production City as a precondition for receiving approval to broadcast material to or from Egypt. The move to this location, situated in the western outskirts of Cairo, is expected to prevent satellite channels from airing live broadcasts of protests and demonstrations that take place in different spots nationwide.

Moreover, the privately-owned On TV received a notice to stop airing its news ticker. And, in yet another incident, four religious satellite channels were closed down for allegedly inciting sectarian tension last week.
Unlike most analysts, Samer Soliman, a political scientist with the American University in Cairo contended that these consecutive incidents might not be connected and do not inherently indicate the introduction of a larger policy aimed at debilitating the private media.

“I believe the regime managed to adapt with the space it has granted to the media," said Soliman. "It has developed more sophisticated tools to control the media.”  The incendiary content of independent papers or TV shows is not enough to prompt any major action on the government’s part, he added.

“It is true that the media constitute a challenge to the regime but they cannot mobilize the people," said Soliman. "The media do not necessarily lead to any action on the street.”

For the last ten years, the media market has witnessed a boom in privately-owned newspapers and satellite channels. Few of these outlets have developed a solid agenda of political coverage that broaches sensitive topics, including the flaws of the Mubarak regime.

Yet, a complete closure of such outlets remains inconceivable, according to Helwan University's Younes.
“Instead, they will keep targeting particular shows or particular channels from one time to another,” he said.

“Closing down the private media is not in the regime’s best interest. The regime needs them to serve as a safety valve whereby people could vent their grievances.”

Appeals Court upholds conviction of Alexandrian political activist



Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English edition 
October 17, 2010

A misdemeanor appeal court today upheld an earlier verdict that convicted a political activist of assaulting and libeling a policeman, but reduced the prison sentence from six months to one month.

“My case is fabricated from start to finish. This verdict is not issued by the judiciary but by police authorities,” Hassan Mustafa, the convict, told Al-Masry Al-Youm in a phone interview from the Mediterranean city of Alexandria where the trial was held.

Mustafa was first arrested in mid-June on grounds of beating and defaming lieutenant colonel Khaled Mohsen in Alexandria.  A couple of days later, the court sentenced him to six months in prison and ordered a fine of LE2000 Egyptian Pounds. Eventually, the 28-year-old activist appealed the verdict, contending that the allegations were fabricated.

Earlier, Mustafa had filed a compliant against another policeman for beating, and dragging him on the ground during a demonstration protesting the notorious murder of Khaled Saeed. Mustafa was on his way to undergo forensic examination when policeman Mohsen intercepted him and leveled accusations against him, according to Mustafa’s lawyers.

“Authorities are sharpening their teeth and using all dishonest means to deter and terrorize political activists,” said Mustafa, who is an active member of  the Popular Democratic Movement for Change (PDMC)--a nascent opposition group that voices socio-economic grievances and denounces the regime of President Hosni Mubarak.

“By virtue of this verdict, the police can chase me or raid my house to take me to jail,” added Mustafa, who was released on bail last summer.

At press time, Mustafa had decided to pre-empt any attempt to stop him, by turning himself in to the police station. “I will not give [the police] the chance to use this verdict to come to my house and terrify my parents. In the meantime, I am not a criminal to let them chase me,” Mustafa told Al-Masry Al-Youm.

The Court of Cassation, which is Egypt’s supreme court of appeal, is Mustafa’s last resort. Yet, even a new appeal might not be resolved soon enough to keep him free, according to lawyers.

“Practically, it will be hard for him to evade jail because by the time the appeal is accepted, Mustafa will have already spent his one-month sentence,” said Haitham Mahamadeen, a lawyer from the Nadim Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, which had delegated attorneys to defend Mustafa.

Legally, Mustafa’s lawyers have the right to submit a petition to the General Prosecutor requesting a suspension of the sentence until the new appeal is resolved on grounds that the convict has a clean record, said Mohamadeen. But the chances that the general prosecutor accepts this petiton are slim, he added.

"The General Prosecutor will refuse it for political reasons, because the case involves a policeman," said Mohamadeen.

Photo: By Tareql Elfaramawy

Farouk Gouida’s Raping a Country: A rant about misappropriation of public properties



Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English edition
October 13, 2010

The title of journalist and poet Farouk Gouida’s recent book--Raping a Country: Crimes of Land Pillaging in Egypt--might suggest that it is a solid piece of extensive research that dissects and contextualizes a notoriously corrupt trend that, in recent years, has attracted a lot of attention.  Unfortunately, the content does not rise to that level of sophistication. “Raping a Country” is only a compilation of opinion columns published over the last five years that, lacking formal research, rely heavily on anecdote and are often clouded by Gouida’s poetic style.

In the 41 columns, the well-known journalist lists several incidents of public properties being appropriated to foreign and Egyptian businessmen in suspicious deals. Gouida dismisses the government as “a real estate broker.”

“The government has focused all its economic activities on selling state-owned assets,” writes Gouida. “Land has become the only good on which to speculate and conclude transactions. It is surrounded by a lot of suspicion and I do not understand why we do not take a stand vis-a-vis this serious chaos.”

The book is laden with national ethos. More than half of the articles are dedicated to foreign, particularly Israeli, attempts to acquire land in the Sinai peninsula, a region fully occupied by Israel for six years. In one piece, Gouida writes about a Zionist project that aims to annex 600 square kilometers in Sinai to the Gaza Strip. Palestinians could claim the land, giving away their territories in the West Bank.
“We should not think that Israel has become a nice dove that wants peace and security all of a sudden. We would be committing an injustice to ourselves if we assumed that Israel wants our prosperity and happiness,” he writes.

Raping a Country could not have hit the market at a better moment. The saga surrounding the selling of 8000 feddans to the Talaat Mostafa Group has made headlines in the local press for the last few weeks. The coverage gained momentum after the court declared that the transaction violated Egyptian law by selling the land to the company without calling for a prior auction. Ultimately, the president intervened and ordered the formation of a legal commission to address the issue.

And earlier this summer, yet another example of suspicious land deals stirred public outrage, when the government was forced to deal with accusations of misappropriation of public land to a company co-owned by Minister of Housing Ahmed El-Maghraby.  The Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics stated that the purchasing company under-priced the state-owned land by LE23 million. Again, the president intervened and cancelled the deal.

The book does not tackle these two cases, but it addresses the marriage between power and money, arguing for an immutable divorce. Gouida wonders, “Why is there an insistence to mix government responsibilities and business?”
In his article, “A Disengagement is Required,” the author discusses the appropriation of 127 feddans in the western suburbs of Cairo to a non-governmental organization formed by Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif and a group of businessmen when Nazif was still a communications minister. The books alleges that the NGO received the land, on which they planned to build a private university, without paying. The author contends that the NGO received far more land than necessary. “It is so unjust to appropriate all this space of 127 feddans for one university that won’t use more than ten feddans,” Gouida writes.

Not content with merely questioning Nazif’s activities, Gouida looks back to Nazif’s prior involvement in similarly flawed deals. In more than one article, Gouida shows how former Prime Minister Atef Ebeid--who spearheaded the privatization of Egypt’s land--conducted irregular transactions that cost the country millions of dollars. The book highlights the notorious case of the Egyptian-Italian businessman Waguih Siag who, in 2003, successfully sued the Egyptian government for US$133 million. More than 160 feddans of land in the Sinai had been appropriated to Siag to build a resort. But when the government found out that Siag’s project was partially financed by Israelis, they repossessed the land.

The government ended up compensating Siag a paltry sum. Gouida worries about the lack of accountability from officials like Ebeid. “Is the case going to be over by just compensating Siag? Does not the matter require investigating and questioning senior officials who were implicated in this tragedy?”

Gouida directs his wrath toward prime ministers and other senior state officials but refrains from putting any blame on the ruling regime or President Mubarak in particular, during whose era large-scale privatization deals have been marred by corruption. On the contrary, the author portrays the president as a messianic figure who intervenes at the last minute to fix all wrongs and prevent the squandering of public properties by his ministers. Gouida conveniently ignores the fact that these officials were selected and appointed by the president himself.

Gouida also fails to highlight the role of the President’s son, Gamal Mubarak, in deepening the overlap between business and politics. Gamal continuously spearheads neo-liberal policies and remains the rallying figure of Egyptian businessmen. Since 2004, he has successfully brought members of his business entourage in to run the cabinet, many of whom were entrusted with ministerial portfolios that help their businesses. By avoiding any explicit criticism of the president and his son, the author walks a fine line between exposing corruption and antagonizing the ruling regime. The fact that most of the articles compiled were originally published in the state-owned Al-Ahram newspaper may explain this cautious strategy.

Because he is a poet, Gouida’s style tends to be more sentimental than informative. The author’s energy goes to expressing his disenchantment in stylized prose and poetry rather than providing elaborate data on the phenomenon of land misappropriation. Consequently, the book lacks vital information like when land sales began, what kind of policies encouraged it, and what political and economic reasons stood behind the boom. In the end, “Raping the Country,” is more of a rant, possessing spirit but little real information.

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

Court hears appeal from activist convicted of assault and slander

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English edition
October 10, 2010


Amid protests against police brutality and human rights violations, a misdemeanor court opened hearings Sunday for an appeal filed by a young Alexandrian activist convicted of beating and slandering a policeman.

“This [case] is meant to terrorize political activists and to discourage them from engaging in any form of protest,” Mohamed Abdel Aziz, Hassan Mostapha’s lawyer, told Al-Masry Al-Youm. “The case is fabricated and the testimonies of the witnesses that the interior ministry has brought are self-contradictory.”

The court is expected to deliver a verdict on October 17.

In June, Hassan Mostafa--currently released on bail--was sentenced to six months in prison and fined LE2000 for the alleged transgressions against a Lieutenant Colonel in Alexandria.

His conviction came on the heels of a complaint that Mostafa had filed earlier against another policeman who the defendant claimed beat him and dragged him on the ground during at a demonstration over the murder of
Khaled Saeed in Alexandria. Hassan was on his way to undergo forensic examinations when the Lieutenant Colonel intercepted him and leveled accusations against him, according to Abdel Aziz.

Mostafa is an active member of the Popular Democratic Movement for Change (PDMC) that emerged last winter to voice socio-economic grievances and to oppose President Hosni Mubarak's rule, the Emergency Law, violations of human rights and corruption.

Surrounded by riot police, dozens of Mostafa’s young supporters rallied outside the court shouting slogans and raising banners condemning torture and police extra-legal practice. Nearly 20 protesters were arrested.
“It is not just Hassan [Mostafa]’s problem but it is the problem of a lot of young people who want change,”

Mohamed Mostafa, the defendant’s brother, said in a video clip posted on the social networking website Facebook last week. “The regime’s coercive apparatus is getting more violent and more brutal against young people who constitute the nuclear of any change in society.”

Turkish school takes US approach to get foothold in Egypt

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm English Edition
October 10, 2010


Last year, Zeinab Abdel Aziz, an Egyptian-American teacher visited Egypt with her family to attend the weddings of her two brothers. Eventually, she decided to temporarily settle here to escape deteriorating economic conditions in the US. But the 31-year-old mother had to first find a decent school for her five-year old son.

“I was looking for an Islamic school; that was the most important thing for me," recalled Abdel Aziz. "At the same time, I wanted an American school because we can go back at any time.”
But as soon as she got wind of the nascent Salahaldin International School (SIS), a Turkish enterprise, Abdel Aziz felt compelled to investigate.

“When they told me about their vision and how they are implementing the American curriculum and applying the values of religion at the same time, I loved the school right away and told my husband 'this is the school',” said Abdel Aziz.

The confluent American curriculum and religious instruction did not only convince Abdel Aziz as a parent; it also encouraged her to apply for a teaching position at SIS. Eventually, her son was enrolled and in the fall of 2009 she was hired as a first-grade teacher.

Salahaldin has, since its establishment less than two years ago, conquered the booming market of international education in Egypt. The institution, located in the heart of Cairo's posh eastern suburbs, has succeeded in attracting 650 students whose parents, like Abdel Aziz, seek both a first-class education and religious upbringing.

“Parents do not want their kids to be totally in a Westernized environment,” said Salahaldin director Shawkat Shimshek. “They want good education with their social values. We said 'this is the environment you are looking for'.”

The school is affiliated with the international movement of widely known, liberal Islamic thinker Fethullah Gulen. Followers of the Sufi intellectual constitute the largest and most influential Islamic group in Turkey. The group, which aims to revitalize the Islamic faith, is known for its moderate views and promotion of universal values. Gulen currently lives in self-exile in the US and preaches tolerance, interfaith dialogue and co-existence between Muslims and the West.

Since the 1990s, the movement has sought to spread Islamic principles through educational outlets in Turkey and abroad. Schools started to crop up in Central Asia and eventually moved across the globe.
“We have a character education program," said Shimshek. "We focus on responsibility, respect, caring, citizenship and giving back to society.”

Islam stands out as the cornerstone of the school’s curriculum. Besides government-dictated religious books, the school offers a “character building” class that is inspired by Islam but taught in English.

“If we speak of honesty, we look for the Hadith [Prophet Mohamed’s sayings and deeds] or the Quranic verses that talk about honesty,” said Shimshek.

Quran sessions are a pillar of the school’s vision. All grade levels including kindergarten are expected to learn how to memorize and recite Quranic verses at least twice a week, according to Shimshek.

Kamal Mogheeth, an expert with the state-run National Center for Educational Resource Development, says schools that combine Western curricula and religious education meet the needs of a rising Islamized elite that seeks integration into an ever-globalizing world.

“These schools have seized the opportunity and want to cater to the need for Western education, foreign languages and the engagement in a global world on one hand and the urge to protect local identities whether religious or ethnic,” said Mogeeth.

But the religious focus at SIS has risked deterring some potential clients like psychiatrist Mona Yosri who was nearly dissuaded from enrolling her two sons last year.

“I did not send them to that school until I felt sure they were moderate," said Yosri. "I fear religious fanaticism especially that there are other Islamic schools that are very violent with kids and make them hate religion.”

Like most international schools in Egypt, the tuition fees at SIS are expensive. Depending on the grade level, the fees range between LE22,000 and LE35,000.

“Egypt is a very good market for international schools,” said Shimshek. “Maybe people want something different, possibly the facilities, the quality of education, and the English language which is very important in this county and the Gulf area. A lot of parents want their kids to be able to speak and communicate in English. They see this as the future for them.”

In small-sized classrooms, students from grade one through twelve are taught by Egyptian, Turkish, British, Canadian and American staff. As English is the first language, the school is keen to hire native speakers as instructors, according to Shimshek.

“They have everything, they make your life easier," said Abdel Aziz. "They pay for everything you want to use in the classroom."

Besides Islam, the school also strives to promote Turkish culture through optional language classes that are offered not only to students but also parents. Every Saturday, Yosri goes to Salahaldin to attend Turkish classes. In addition to language training, teachers and students are sent on exploratory journeys to Turkey during breaks in the school year.

“Turkish people serve as a good example for us,” said Yosri. “One of the reasons why I chose the school is because Turkey has progressed at an amazing pace in the last 20 years. I hope we can benefit from them and their expertise.”

In recent years, Turkey has risen as a formidable regional force, challenging traditional Middle Eastern power-wielders.

In May, the Turkish administration, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, impressed Arab observers by embarrassing Israel on the international stage after Israeli forces attacked the Turkish flotilla seeking to break the Gaza blockade. That incident added to Erdogan's established credibility in the region after he had clashed with Israeli President Shimon Peres over the humanitarian situation in Gaza at The World Economic Forum a couple of years ago.

Turkey is also regarded by laymen and intellectuals alike in the Arab World as a success story for its continuous progress and European Union admission prospects. The fascination with the Turkish model had prompted the Egyptian regime to routinely launch smear campaigns against Turkey in the state-owned press.
Turkish investment in education in the Arab region should be read in this context, according to Mogeeth.

“Turkey wants to play a regional role and it is logical for it to do that in parts of its former empire that fell almost a hundred years ago,” Mogeeth says. “It does not have to resurrect an empire along Ottoman lines but it can do it by spreading its Turkish culture.”